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In early January 2017, The Independent reported ‘a love story which delivers some optimism in 
the bitterness of  the refugee crisis’.1 The story about a Macedonian border guard and an Iraqi 
refugee who fell in love, married and were awaiting a child might be called a trivial anecdote, yet 
it underlines an important point. No matter how abstract the language of  border securitization 
and irregular migration gets on a policy level, their enforcement will involve the actual encoun-
ter of  persons – with all the unpredictability that this entails.
The encounter of  persons at the border, particularly in the context of  maritime migration 
stands at the centre of  Itamar Mann’s reflections in Humanity at Sea. In question is not the pos-
sibility of  a love story but, rather, the very basis of  rights. Mann’s theory of  the encounter as a 
basis of  human rights law is an intellectual contribution that could not be timelier, especially 
for a European audience. And it is a contribution that advances innovative ideas for a field often 
framed as mere interplay between largely ineffective laws and interest-driven politics – the access 
to territory and asylum.
Generally, few rules limit states in their discretionary decision of  whom to admit to their ter-
ritory. The laws of  refugee protection form one important exception. Yet while the principle 
of  non-refoulement applies at the border, no explicit rules hinder states to deter persons from 
reaching the border.2 Various strategies of  deterrence have been subject to scholarly discussion 
and numerous court decisions, and they continue to develop in response to evolving legal con-
straints.3 Itamar Mann’s book does not contradict the analyses of  those tensions, yet it offers 
a change of  perspective, reconstructing the human rights claims and obligations from the 
moment of  encounter in the case of  maritime migration and the interdiction or surveillance of  
boats. Even though measures of  deterrence may be designed to escape legal constraints, Mann 
suggests that the situation of  encounter as such can constitute a source of  law, a source of  
human rights claims and obligations.
The book is organized in six chapters along historical events. The theoretical argument devel-
ops successively with reference to those events, which might disappoint readers looking for a 
concentration of  the theory in one place. Yet there are good reasons for this method. Not only 
is this a book worth reading from beginning to end, for the stories and historical summaries are 
highly instructive by themselves. The incremental reasoning also corresponds to the author’s 
1 W. Worley, ‘Iraqi Refugee and Macedonian Border Guard Marry after Falling in Love at Muddy Border 
Crossing’, The Independent (4 January 2017), available at www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
iraq-refugee-macedonia-border-guard-marry-fall-in-love-serbia-kurdish-muslim-orthodox-chris-
tian-a7509441.html (last visited 15 March 2017).
2 This has been labelled the ‘schizophrenic attitude’ of  states towards international refugee law. Hathaway 
and Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of  Cooperative Deterrence’, 53(2) Columbia 
Journal of  Transnational Law (2015) 235.
3 Cf. T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of  Migration 
Control (2011), at 149ff; Paz, ‘Between the Kingdom and the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, 
and Border Walls’, 34(1) Berkeley Journal of  International Law (2016) 10.
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reconstructive rather than constructive approach. He does not offer a theory that he subse-
quently substantiates with examples. Rather, his theory evolves from a detailed consideration 
of  diverse material, including court decisions, the opinions of  judges and of  scholars as well as 
public debates reflected in media reports. The selection and assessment of  this material inevita-
bly introduces the individual view and position of  the author. It could not be different, as Mann 
stresses (at 20). That human rights constitute universalist claims does not mean we can think 
about them from a universal, disembodied standpoint.
The first chapter tells the story of  the ship Exodus, given that name in 1947 while on its 
way towards Palestine with around 4,500 Jewish refugees on board (at 37). Intercepted by the 
British navy, they were returned to Europe, yet many of  them ultimately made their way to Israel 
(at 38). Mann’s focus lies on the interception of  the Exodus as discussed in a British Court of  
Appeals case. Sailing towards Palestine, the migrants were determined to either reach the land 
or ‘embarrass’ the British authorities by ‘putting themselves in their hand’ (at 47). This invoca-
tion of  one’s own humanity vis-à-vis a person who has the power to save one’s life is what Mann 
views as one side to the ‘rights of  encounter’ (at 42). The defenceless presence of  a powerless 
party triggers a ‘command of  the conscience’ (at 12) because the very basis of  human existence 
is at stake.4
Two further themes appear here and are pursued in the following chapters. The universal-
ity of  the question raised by (the appearance of) the powerless party, whom Mann in this sense 
frames as the universal boatperson, and the transnational audience, in front of  whom the 
encounter takes place. Chapter 2 explores the notion of  the universal boatperson and the mean-
ing of  her human rights claim by looking at refugee situations in the decades after the adoption 
of  the 1951 Refugee Convention,5 especially the case of  boat people from Vietnam. Chapter 3, 
in turn, discusses the side of  the human rights commitment, with reference foremost to refugees 
from Haiti arriving on the coasts of  the United States in the 1990s and the famous Sale deci-
sion regarding the legality of  interception on the high sea.6 Mann’s chapters interpreting these 
situations, the decision and Judge Blackmun’s dissent (at 117) draw on the thought of  Hannah 
Arendt in various aspects. The arrival of  boat people, who have no established right to enter the 
territory, are concrete instances that raise the question of  the ‘right to have rights’,7 constituting 
a ‘test for law’ (at 71). For the receiving community, their arrival entails the question about the 
basis of  law and politics. While the idea of  the social contract draws the picture of  a static com-
munity, the arrival of  refugees brings to mind the omnipresent histories of  migration, asking 
how far ‘[w]e the people’ can include ‘[w]e refugees’ (at 119).
Chapter 4 examines situations of  maritime migration and interdictions along the Australian 
coast, thereby exploring the significance of  the transnational audience to the encounter. 
Mann reconstructs how both parties seek to shape, to provoke or to prevent how and whether 
the encounter takes place. The policies of  offshore processing constitute attempts to prevent 
migrants from addressing themselves to particular persons with the ‘universal boatperson’s 
message’ (at 149). Migrants in turn confront these attempts by ‘generat[ing] their emergen-
cies’ (at 136). The battles about what pictures are produced and reach the public indicate how 
4 As Judith Butler puts it, ‘[t]o kill the other is to deny my life, … that sense of  my life which is, from the start, 
and invariably, social life’. J. Butler, Frames of  War (2009), at xxvi.
5 Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees (Refugee Convention) 1951, 189 UNTS 150.
6 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 US 155 (1993) (US SC). In question stood an executive order foresee-
ing that undocumented migrants could be intercepted and repatriated. While the Court of  Appeals had 
held that the protection of  the Refugee Convention and the US Immigration and Nationality Act, 79 Stat. 
911, applied, the Supreme Court ruled that its application was limited to the territory of  the USA.
7 H. Arendt, The Origins of  Totalitarianism (1951), at 296ff.
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the defenseless presence can amount to a powerful argument and underline how the rights of  
encounter relate to questions of  visibility. Very insightful in this context is the discussion of  
‘moral risk’ and ‘moral blackmail’. Blaming persons for ‘moral blackmail’ when they put them-
selves at risk, first, expresses the moral relevance the presence of  the refugee has (at 157) and, 
second, reflects a certain offense felt about the active part that the powerless party thereby plays 
(at 159).
With regard to the audience or spectators to the encounter, two different aspects are at stake, 
the distinction of  which remains rather vague. On the one hand, the public is the audience in 
front of  which the individual encounter takes place. On the other hand, the addressed public 
constitutes a party to the encounter in a more abstract sense. The public as participant in the 
encounter is the subject of  the following two chapters, which deal with migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean towards Europe. Chapter 5 develops how surveillance works as a way to control 
migration and, at the same time, avoid individual contact, seeking to ‘eliminate the encoun-
ter’ (at 174). Chapter 6 in turn examines narratives of  European self-conception in light of  the 
arrival of  refugees. The question here is the ‘imaginary encounter’ between Europe and refugees 
(at 197), who according to the 2015 State of  the Union address by Jean-Claude Juncker, which 
Mann analyses, ‘receive the bread’ (at 199).
Both for the encounter between individuals and for the encounter on a more abstract level, the 
third party – the audience – is crucial. On the individual level, the background presence of  the 
public transforms private emotions into political reasons, as Mann illustrates in the postscript 
when retelling the story of  Moses’ exposure and rescue (at 231). In the moment of  encounter, 
the person able to save a life is confronted with the ‘test of  law’ (at 71, see also above), which goes 
beyond a moral question in a detached bilateral relationship. First, affirming the link between 
human existence and basic rights, the individual makes a judgment about more than the con-
crete situation. Second, the possible later judgment of  others is present in the situation of  the 
encounter. Both sides are thus involved in constructing the encounter in a way that is favourable 
for them in the eyes of  ‘a transnational audience of  third-party observers’ (at 178). In the case 
of  the abstract encounter, the object of  judgment concerns the collective self-understanding of  
a community.
The book abstains from exploring more closely the relationship between the two levels of  
encounter. How does the experience of  individual encounters inform the political debate, and 
how does the knowledge about present and future encounters influence political decisions at the 
individual level? The question about the relationship between law and politics pervades the book 
but remains somewhat ambiguous. Mann opposes ‘the primacy of  politics over law’ (at 221), 
and it is a great strength of  the book that it conceptualizes the encounter as being shaped by the 
agency of  migrants without reducing it to an instance of  struggle and political confrontation. 
Yet the description of  ‘non-positive human rights law’ (at 221) is easily misunderstood as a pre-
political law, which judging from the overall argument is not the claim Mann wants to make. 
The reference to a third party audience together with the notion of  judgment8 suggest that a 
political dimension is inherent in these norms and that we should read the rights of  encounter 
along the lines of  a non-hierarchical, equiprimordial relationship between law and politics.9
This brings us back to the proposition the book sets out with – the dual foundation of  inter-
national law, as based on state sovereignty, on the one hand, and the encounter between 
8 No explicit concept of  judgment is discussed, yet the close alignment with Arendtian thought might indi-
cate an understanding of  judgment in that direction. See H. Arendt, The Life of  the Mind (1971), at 195. 
For an interpretation, cf. Zerilli, ‘“We Feel Our Freedom”: Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of  
Hannah Arendt’, 33(2) Political Theory (2005) 158.
9 For such understanding with reference to Hannah Arendt’s thought, see C.  Volk, Arendtian 
Constitutionalism: Law, Politics and the Order of  Freedom (2015), at 173ff.
652 EJIL 28 (2017), 649–663
individuals, on the other (at 13). What we can certainly draw from Mann’s concept of  the 
encounter as a normative-political moment is that law is not limited to deliberately agreed and 
drafted rules. This conception applies to law on various levels, be it local rules, domestic law, 
supra- or international law. It follows that the qualification of  the rights of  encounter as founda-
tion of  international law seems both too narrow and too broad: it is too broad when equating 
human rights norms with international law, and too narrow when linking the significance of  
the rights of  encounter solely to the international level. The instances of  encounter discussed in 
the book can be understood as a source of  human rights obligations, be they in their interna-
tional or national law guise. Also the decision-making processes within sovereign states appear 
linked to those instances of  encounter, which inform the political process and are duplicated by 
the ‘imaginary encounter’ of  the political community (at 197, see also above).
In my reading, the book answers a question more specific than the foundation of  human 
rights but still extremely fundamental in nature: the non-abstract foundation of  rights at the 
territorial boundaries of  a political community. Against conceptions of  human rights grounded 
in abstract morality, it has been pointed out that rights are effective and meaningful only in 
connection with some form of  political relationship. Hannah Arendt’s critique of  the idea of  
inalienable rights,10 and the ensuing reflections about the possibility of  a ‘right to have rights’, 
constitute a focal point in this regard. Recognizing the tension between the universality of  uni-
versal rights and the concreteness necessary to make them meaningful, scholars have offered 
interpretations of  the ‘right to have rights’ as the object of  declaration,11 thus of  universal rights 
as outcomes of  continuous political processes and struggles.12 This concrete, more political 
interpretation of  human rights, however, tends to focus on relations between persons who are 
already co-present. Mann’s theory of  the rights of  encounter addresses the gap that many criti-
cal approaches have left unaddressed – the rights of  the person at the border, of  the person not 
yet present on the territory and within the community. It does so in a way that bridges demands 
of  concreteness and universality: the ‘rights of  encounter’ are concrete in that the moment of  
encounter between particular persons brings them about, and they are universal in that they 
arise from a sense of  universal equality, which makes the mere knowledge of  the other person’s 
humanity sufficient for an obligation to save her life.
There remain many themes to be pursued: The relationship between the two levels of  encoun-
ter, the imaginary and the actual. The relationship between the powerless party’s power of  
presence and the role of  her agency. And, correspondingly, the relationship between the mere 
survival at stake in the situation of  encounter and a person’s political existence and member-
ship, which is what Mann references with freedom (at 78, 234). The book makes arguments and 
takes positions in these questions, but it does not present a closed case and offers a rich basis for 
taking up lines of  thinking.
The notion of  the rights of  encounter adds a distinct perspective to the debate about legal 
conditions of  access to territory and a tool for interpretation of  the rapid and complex develop-
ments we see in this regard. The efforts of  the European Union towards a rigid migration control 
through third country cooperation in that sense can be read as attempts not only to avoid legal 
responsibilities but also to avoid encounters that would ‘embarrass’ the European public. The 
remarkable opinion delivered by Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi to the European Court of  
10 Arendt speaks of  how ‘the very phrase ‘human rights’ became … the evidence of  hopeless idealism or 
fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy’. Arendt, supra note 7, at 296.
11 A. Gündoğdu, Rightlessness in an Age of  Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of  Migrants 
(2015), at 168ff, with reference to Judith Butler in J. Butler and G. Chakravorty Spivak, Who Sings the 
Nation-State? Language, Politics, Belonging (2007), at 48.
12 Cf. Rancière, ‘Who Is the Subject of  the Rights of  Man?’, 103(2–3) South Atlantic Quarterly (2004) 297.
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Justice in February 2017 may be read through this lens as responding to Europe’s imaginary 
encounter.13 The opinion ends with the image that Mann’s book begins with: the picture of  the 
body of  Aylan Kurdi washed ashore on the Turkish coast, which stirred the conscience of  peo-
ple worldwide. Relating to it, Mengozzi writes: ‘It is commendable and salutary to be outraged. 
In the present case, the Court nevertheless has the opportunity to go further, … by enshrining 
the legal access route to international protection. … Make no mistake: it is not because emo-
tion dictates this, but because EU law demands it.’14 The Court did not follow Advocate General 
Mengozzi.15 But this does not end reflections about the rights of  encounter and law’s demands.
Dana Schmalz 




13 Case C-638/16, X. and X. v. State of  Belgium, Opinion of  the Advocate General M. Paolo Mengozzi, deliv-
ered on 7 February 2017, (ECLI:EU:C:2017:93). Paolo Mengozzi. The case did not concern an interdic-
tion at sea but the responsibility possibly triggered by a request for humanitarian visa filed by a Syrian 
family at the Belgian embassy in Beirut. Advocate General Mengozzi interprets European Union (EU) law 
to require the granting of  a visa under those particular circumstances of  the case. Since EU law is applied, 
he argues, the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, Doc. 2012/C 326/02, 26 October 
2012, also finds application and turns the possibility of  delivering such visa into an obligation, since the 
applicants otherwise face inescapable harm to their lives and safety.
14 Ibid., at, para 175.
15 Case C-638/16, X. and X. v. State of  Belgium, judgment of  7 March 2017 (ECLI:EU:C:2017:173).
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One may make the argument that at the same time all and very few international law books 
deal with interpretation. In books about international law, questions arise as to the meaning 
of  certain norms and, consequently, these norms are being interpreted. Yet, quite surprisingly, 
there are few books that can claim to be about interpretation in international law. A book about 
interpretation requires proper reflection and a specific take on the issue of  interpretation. The 
editors and authors of  Interpretation in International Law, in my view, have managed to write 
a book about interpretation. In this review, I  focus on the first and the last contributions and 
briefly introduce the other contributions with a noteworthy sentence from their chapters.
In the book’ s first chapter ‘The Game of  Interpretation in International Law’, Andrea Bianchi 
describes the process of  interpretation as a game of  cards. For him, the notion of  a game is a 
metaphor that can be applied to interpretation since the central features of  a game – like players, 
rules, strategies and objects – are also present in interpretation. His approach is characterized 
by a close observation of  the actual practice of  interpretation without detailed epistemological 
explanation. His observation reveals that the rules of  treaty interpretation are contingent in 
nature and have changed siginificantly over time. The object of  interpretation is to persuade 
the audience; it has a rhetorical function. Regarding the players, the game of  interpretation is 
generally open to everyone, but different perspectives have different weight. As he later states, 
the ‘fight is about controlling the discursive policies of  the discipline’ (at 43). He perceives inter-
pretation as a card game, the cards being ‘mostly those contained in the Vienna Convention on 
